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Riots are extreme events, and much of the early research on rioting
suggested that the decision making of rioters was far from rational and
could only be understood from the perspective of a collective mind. In
the current study, we derive and test a set of expectations regarding rioter
spatial decision making developed from theories originally intended to
explain patterns of urban crime when law and order prevail—crime pat-
tern and social disorganization theory—and consider theories of collec-
tive behavior and contagion. To do this, we use data for all riot-related
incidents that occurred in London in August 2011 that were detected by
the police. Unlike most studies of victimization, we use a random utility
model to examine simultaneously how the features of the destinations
selected by rioters, the origins of their journeys, and the characteristics
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of the offenders influence offender spatial decision making. The results
demonstrate that rioter target choices were far from random and pro-
vide support for all three types of theory, but for crime pattern theory in
particular. For example, rioters were more likely to engage in the dis-
order close to their home location and to select areas that contained
routine activity nodes and transport hubs, and they were less likely to
cross the Thames River. In terms of contagion, rioters were found to be
more likely to target areas that had experienced rioting in the previous
24 hours. From a policy perspective, the findings provide insight into the
types of areas that may be most vulnerable during riots and why this is
the case, and when particular areas are likely to be at an elevated risk of
this type of disorder.
For certain types of civil disorder, such as a protest against a govern-
ment, the spatial distribution of unrest often can be explained by the lo-
cations of key targets, such as nearby government buildings and symbolic
public spaces. In the case of rioting, which commonly lacks the central and
coherent political motivation of protest, a wide range of different factors
may contribute to an individual’s decision as to whether to engage in the
disorder. Varying motivations also may affect the choice of where individ-
uals choose to offend or the consistency with which different factors influ-
ence offender spatial decision making. If this is the case, then the spatial
distribution of rioting should be difficult to predict a priori or to explain a
posteriori. Moreover, one might anticipate that theories designed to explain
offender decision making for urban crimes committed when law and order
prevail would provide little insight into the spatial decision making of those
engaged in rioting when they do not.
To examine this issue, we explore the spatial distribution of the riots that
occurred in London during August 2011. Between August 6 and 10, 2011,
riots occurred at numerous locations across the United Kingdom. Violence
initially broke out after a peaceful protest by family, friends, and members
of the community of Mark Duggan, who was shot and killed by police offi-
cers in Tottenham, North London, on August 4. On August 6, riots broke
out in neighboring communities. For five nights, the riots continued, initially
throughout the capital and subsequently throughout the country. After the
initial disturbances, the unrest on subsequent nights grew in intensity, be-
fore large numbers of police were deployed across the capital and other
cities, leading to a restoration of order. It is estimated that the final cost of
liabilities associated with damages from the riots is in the region of £250
million (Metropolitan Police Service, 2012).
Predominantly, the riots took place in the highly populated areas of
London, Birmingham, and Manchester. However, even within these cities,
and particularly in London, civil unrest occurred in some areas but not
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in others. Some areas within these cities experienced persistent unrest on
more than one night, whereas others experienced no unrest at all. We ex-
amine the extent to which these patterns might be considered random or
whether systematic patterns emerge that would plausibly be explained by
existing criminological theory concerned with crime patterns. To do this,
we use a discrete spatial choice approach (McFadden, 1974) to compare the
characteristics of those locations at which rioters chose to commit offenses
with the characteristics of those locations at which they could have engaged
in crime but did not. The approach is distinct from prior research on the
spatial distribution of civil disorder in that we consider not only where ri-
oters engaged in these activities but also how their decisions to do so were
affected by where they live. In addition, we examine whether and how the
overall spatial decision making of offenders changed as the civil disorder
evolved and eventually came to an end. Given the political salience of ri-
ots, testing theories concerned with the dynamics of such events not only
advances criminological understanding but also carries considerable policy
value.
This article is organized as follows: First, we discuss a theoretical account
of offender spatial decision making, taking into account literature includ-
ing that concerned with collective behavior and environmental criminology.
We explain how the London riots of August 2011 present an opportunity
to explore the micrologic target choice of offenders during events of civil
disorder (Wilkinson, 2009), particularly regarding the question of whether
there are any regularities across the population or, conversely, whether tar-
gets are chosen with apparent randomness because of the widely varying
motives of individuals. We present a description of the analytical strategy
adopted, explain why such an approach is appropriate, and then report our
findings. Finally, we discuss the implications of the findings for criminolog-
ical theory.
THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS AND PREVIOUS
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Empirical research concerned with riots has for some time focused on
countering theories of irrational and “animal-like” behavior within groups
of individuals, such as those posited by Le Bon (1960) and Freud (1957).
These theories assert that a collective act of violence can be understood
only by considering the behavior of a crowd as being driven by an irrational
collective mind with targets more or less selected at random. Since this early
work, however, researchers have argued that the process of rioting is driven
by a more rational process (e.g., Berk, 1974; Mason, 1984; McPhail, 1991).
According to such accounts, individuals decide whether to engage in the
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rioting based on the available information and some internal cost–benefit
calculation. Even after individuals have decided to engage, they have more
control over their actions than is suggested by early accounts of collective
violence. For instance, some studies have found evidence that targets are
chosen selectively by rioters (Auyero and Moran, 2007; Berk and Aldrich,
1972; Rosenfeld, 1997) and indeed that, by considering those targets, we
can learn more about the dynamics involved in a riot process (Martin,
McCarthy, and McPhail, 2009). This perspective is the one adopted in this
study.
Criminologists have been concerned with the spatial analysis of crime for
some time. Indeed, as early as the nineteenth century, Quetelet (1983) ex-
amined spatial patterns of crime across the provinces in France, noting that
there were regularities in the variation in crime risk across geographic areas
(see also Guerry, 1832; Mayhew, 1965). Shaw and McKay’s (1969) classic
research also examined variation in spatial patterns, but this time analyses
were conducted within cities. Since these landmark studies, a large body
of research, using methods of increasing sophistication, has emerged, and
with respect to patterns of victimization, the research has shown that crime
does in fact form spatial clusters (for recent reviews, see Johnson, 2010;
Weisburd, Bruinsma, and Bernasco, 2009). Considering attempts at expla-
nation, a variety of theories exist. In this article, we focus on three sets of ac-
counts, each of which offer different perspectives regarding offender spatial
decision making: routine activity and crime pattern theory, social disorga-
nization theory, and collective behavior and contagion. Broadly conceived,
these different theoretical accounts may be thought of as informing why an
offender might become aware of particular opportunities and favor some
over others, how the social makeup of an area might influence the likeli-
hood of crime occurring within it, and how offender decision making might
be influenced by the current or recent criminal activity of others. We discuss
each of these accounts in turn in the next section.
ROUTINE ACTIVITY AND CRIME PATTERN
THEORY
Theories of urban crime have long been inspired by ideas from ecology
(see Felson, 2006). Many of these theories stem from Cohen and Felson’s
routine activity theory (1979), which states that the necessary conditions
for crime to occur are the convergence in space and time of a motivated of-
fender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian. According
to this theory, the routine activity patterns of people shape the opportuni-
ties for this convergence and, hence, for crime to occur. In this way, crime
is viewed as a largely parasitic activity, sustained by everyday routines.
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Crime pattern theory (CPT; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993) more
specifically examines how activity patterns shape awareness of criminal op-
portunities and how this may lead to the emergence of spatial concen-
trations of crime. According to CPT, people create mental maps of their
routine activity spaces, which contain several key elements. For example,
routine activity nodes represent those places that individuals visit fre-
quently or at which they spend much of their time. These places would
include—but are not limited to—a person’s home location, his or her place
of work, recreation centers/facilities, and so on. Prominent features of the
urban environment also are expected to shape the awareness spaces of peo-
ple. For example, much of the population will be familiar with, and may
spend a significant amount of time at, local landmarks, including retail cen-
ters, transport hubs such as train stations, and schools (Bernasco and Block,
2009).
Awareness spaces are assumed to develop for these nodes (landmarks)
and the areas around them, but also for the pathways that must be traveled
to move from one routine activity node to another. In the case of a single
offender, it is at the locations that his or her awareness spaces overlap with
suitable opportunities for crime that the offender is anticipated to engage
in criminal activity. In support of this, and in line with the principle of least
effort (Zipf, 1949), studies of the journey to crime (for a recent review, see
Townsley and Sidebottom, 2010) indicate that, despite the many and var-
ied opportunities available to them, most offenders commit crime close to
their home location. In the case of more general crime patterns, whereas
offender awareness spaces will largely be idiosyncratic, there will be some
overlap between them, and it is where these overlaps intersect with suitable
opportunities for crime that, according to CPT, spatial concentrations of
crime are most likely to form.
On the basis of crime pattern theory, we would therefore expect that,
ceteris paribus, during civil disorder, offenders will be more likely to choose
locations to offend that are close to where they reside, which contain
schools, public transport hubs, retail centers, and locations that are prox-
imate to the city center. In the case of rioting, of course, we note that retail
centers, in particular, may be targeted simply because they contain oppor-
tunities for looting. Nevertheless, we expect retail centers to act as crime
attractors and that, where they are targeted, the retail centers chosen will
be those that are likely to be within an awareness space of an offender.
Instead of being time stable, awareness spaces are likely to change over
the life course (see Bernasco, 2010), with some nodes of activity (e.g., school
and work) featuring more prominently for one age group than for another.
Similarly, as people mature from childhood to adulthood, their mobility and
routine activity nodes are likely to change (e.g., Snook et al., 2005; Towns-
ley and Sidebottom, 2010), thereby extending the range of their awareness
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spaces. For these reasons, our expectation is that if CPT applies in the case
of riots, then younger offenders will be more likely to target areas that con-
tain routine activity nodes that are particularly relevant to them, such as
schools, and are more likely to select targets that are closer to their home
location, reflecting their more limited awareness spaces.
As discussed, offender awareness of a location is likely to be inversely re-
lated to the distance between that location and their routine activity nodes.
This theory is supported by ethnographic studies of offender behavior (e.g.,
Rengert and Wasilchick, 2000) and is illustrated in the pattern of distance
decay exhibited in research concerned with the journey to crime. In the
case of the latter, distance can be considered a measure of impedance that
affects the likelihood of an individual becoming familiar with a particular
area. However, factors other than distance can influence awareness in this
way. For example, features of the urban environment, such as natural barri-
ers (e.g., rivers) or transport links (e.g., underground stations), may impede
or facilitate the ease with which people can travel to, and hence become
familiar with, a particular location. In their study, Clare, Fernandez, and
Morgan (2009) examined the extent to which features of the physical envi-
ronment, such as major highways and rivers, act as barriers to an offender’s
choice of burglary location. They found that the presence of either feature
between the home location of an offender and a potential target area de-
creases the likelihood that the latter will be selected. In the case of London,
it is likely that the greatest such barrier and, thus, influence of this kind on
the spatial decision making of offenders is the River Thames. The Thames
divides London into distinct northern and southern areas, and although
bridges connect North and South London, the presence of the Thames can
substantially impedemovement between the two. Given the size of the river
and the scope for natural barriers to shape offender awareness spaces, our
expectation is that offenders will be less likely to cross the river to offend.
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION THEORY
Theories of social disorganization consider how variation in the social
fabric of a community might impact levels of crime (Shaw and McKay,
1969; see also Bursik, 1988). In particular, they suggest that relative to other
neighborhoods, in those for which there is a sense of community (e.g., Fisse
and Braithwaite, 1983), residents are more likely to intervene to prevent
crime. For such theories, social cohesion is a necessary precondition for
members of neighborhoods to act in this way, or for the neighborhood to
possess what Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) referred to as collec-
tive efficacy.
Social cohesion can be influenced by several factors. For example, in
neighborhoods with a transient population, there will be relatively fewer
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opportunities for the formation of stable social ties (e.g., Coleman, 1988),
thereby eroding the potential for cohesive bonds to form. Ethnic diversity
also has been discussed as a potential barrier to social cohesion, with non-
homogeneous communities failing to share a consensus (e.g., Sampson and
Groves, 1989), thereby decreasing the likelihood that they will act collec-
tively.
Deprivation too has been discussed in this context. In particular, rather
than having a direct negative effect on crime (as would be argued by ad-
vocates of dispositional theories of crime, e.g., Agnew, 1992), Shaw and
McKay (1969) argued that, in disadvantaged neighborhoods, communities
lack the resources and organizational base of their more affluent counter-
parts, which limits the extent to which they can exert informal social control
to deter crime in the neighborhood.
Social disorganization may influence the likelihood of riots occurring
in a neighborhood in many ways. First, cohesive neighborhoods may ex-
ert control over their own residents to reduce the likelihood that they
will engage in disorder, or form a rioting crowd. Second, signs of cohe-
sion within a neighborhood might affect whether offenders—wherever they
live—choose to engage in disorder within that neighborhood. In the sec-
ond case, social cohesion might be perceived as acting as a social barrier
(Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005) that deters rioters from targeting or coa-
lescing in a neighborhood. On the basis of theories of social disorganization,
we would anticipate more riot-related events to occur in those neigh-
borhoods in which social cohesion may be low, in particular in those
neighborhoods that have higher population churn rates, greater ethnic di-
versity, and that are more deprived.
COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR AND CONTAGION
Recognizing that an individual’s spatial decision making might be influ-
enced by the decisions of others, Bernasco (2006) considered the likely
impact of co-offending on spatial patterns of crime. However, the current
study is somewhat distinct from much of the previous work on offender
spatial decision making, including that on co-offending. This is principally
because, for rioting, the mutual activity of previously unacquainted offend-
ers can potentially affect the target choices of others. Moreover, compared
with influences that are unlikely to change dramatically on a short time
scale, such as offender routine activity nodes, in the case of riots, the ac-
tions of others may have a much more dynamic impact on offender spatial
decision making. For instance, an offender may choose a location to offend
based on where offenses are currently taking place or where they occurred
in the past. One reason for this is the idea of safety in numbers, whereby
the perceived risk of arrest is likely to be lower in those areas where
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rioters substantially outnumber law enforcement (Epstein, 2002; Granovet-
ter, 1978).
Some researchers have suggested that a social contagion process was at
least partly responsible for the severe escalation and perseverance of ob-
served patterns during the riots in London (e.g., Gross, 2011). Indeed a
process of social contagion, possibly facilitated by social networks or con-
ventional media reports, could lead to the presence of more motivated of-
fenders at particular locations. This concept of social contagion between in-
dividuals has been used tomodel many social processes including the spread
of innovation (e.g., Rogers, 1995; Walker, 1969), policies (e.g., Elkins and
Simmons, 2005; Shipan and Volden, 2008), opinion formation (e.g., Huck-
feldt and Sprague, 1995; Schelling, 1978), democratization (e.g., Elkink,
2011; O’Loughlin et al., 1998), and of course, rioting and urban disorder
(e.g., Granovetter, 1978; Midlarsky, 1978; Myers, 2000). However, as out-
lined by Myers (2000), care must be taken in interpreting the concept of
contagion to avoid confusion between irrational actors having no choice in
getting “swept up” in rioting—as would be the case in contagion of a dis-
ease and, of course, the interpretation of riots by Le Bon (1960)—and those
that are more willing to engage because of the contagion after weighing up
the costs and benefits of doing so, which is the approach we take here.
In the case of riots, a process of social contagion might encourage po-
tential offenders to engage in the disorder more so than they otherwise
would. For example, Wortley (2001) argued that situational precipitators,
such as environmental cues, events, or influences, can prompt, pressure,
permit, or provoke criminal behavior (see also Wortley, 2008). It is pos-
sible that visible signs of rioting act as precipitators that encourage poten-
tial offenders to engage in the disorder. In this way, a form of contagion
might be considered to operate if it is the case that those who live near
to, or happen to pass by, riots are encouraged to engage in the disorder.
This would assume that witnessing such disorder serves to prompt, pres-
sure, permit, or provoke such behavior. It is important to be clear that
such an argument does not assume that offenders cease to act like ratio-
nal agents but that the decision to engage in a criminal event can be dy-
namic and may be influenced by more than an individual’s internal desires
or motivations. In the case that this explanation has a part to play, we would
expect that, where there have recently been riots, this should generate an
increase in the number of offenders that are willing to engage in the disor-
der, but for those that participate, their offending would be expected to be
local.
An alternative form of a contagion-like process also could operate by
attracting offenders to particular areas, regardless of how far they would
need to travel to reach them. In this case, particularly if this were the dom-
inant process, the assumption would be that offenders are in a state of
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readiness to offend, and that their awareness of riot locations, or where
they are planned to take place, merely influences where they decide to
engage in the disorder. In this case, the distance between where offend-
ers live and offend would be expected to play a more limited role in of-
fender spatial decision making than has been observed for other types of
offenses.
In this study, we take the perspective that a motivated offender will make
an independent choice of where to offend; however, that choice may de-
pend on where previous outbreaks of disorder have recently occurred—
a form of event dependency (see Johnson, 2008). In other words, we test
whether unrest at a particular location results in offenders being more
likely to choose that particular location, as opposed to other locations—that
would otherwise be equally attractive to rioters—where there is no unrest.
We would expect, ceteris paribus, rioters to be more likely to select a site at
which prior offenses have taken place recently. Additionally, in the event
that those engaged in riots select targets by engaging in at least a crude form
of rational decision making, we would expect to observe a pattern of decay
for the distance between their home and offense locations.
HYPOTHESES
Based on the preceding theoretical discussion, we have derived a set of
expectations regarding the spatial decision making of rioters. For clarity
of presentation, these are summarized in table 1. Each of these hypotheses
will be tested subsequently using data for crimes committed during the 2011
London riots that were detected by the police.
ANALYTIC STRATEGY
Studies that examine patterns of crime at the area level usually exam-
ine the characteristics of one of two areas of interest—the location from
which the offender originated or resides or the location at which the of-
fense occurred. Studies of the former imply that characteristics such as the
demographics of an area will in some way contribute to the number of moti-
vated offenders residing in that area at a given time (e.g., Shaw andMcKay,
1969). Studies of the latter suggest that characteristics of an area may in-
crease the opportunity for crime, given the presence of motivated offend-
ers (e.g., Bernasco and Luykx, 2003; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1995).
However, as Bernasco and Block (2009: 94) pointed out, “the tendency for
crime to take place relatively close to where the person committing it lives
(indeed sometimes at home) has ledmany researchers to confuse the origins
and the destinations of criminal events.” In part, this limitation has been ad-
dressed by studies concerned with the journey to crime (e.g., Block, Galary,
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Table 1. Summary of Hypotheses Organized by Theoretical
Perspective
Theoretical Perspective Hypothesis
Crime pattern theory 1. Rioters are more likely to offend in areas that are closest
to the area in which they reside.
2. Relative to adult offenders, juvenile offenders are more
likely to offend in an area that is closer to the area within
which they live.
3. Rioters are more likely to offend in areas that contain a
school, and this is particularly the case for juvenile
offenders.
4. Rioters are more likely to offend in areas that contain
transport links, in this case, underground train stations.
5. Rioters are more likely to offend in areas that contain
more retail facilities.
6. Rioters are more likely to offend in areas that are closer to
the city center.
7. Rioters are more likely to offend at locations on the same
side of the River Thames as their residence.
Social disorganization
theory
8. Rioters are more likely to offend in areas with higher
population churn rates.
9. Rioters are more likely to offend in areas with greater
ethnic diversity.
10. Rioters are more likely to offend in areas with higher
levels of deprivation.
Collective behavior and
contagion
11. Rioters are more likely to offend in locations that have
recently experienced unrest.
and Brice, 2007; Smith, 1976;Wiles and Costello, 2000). However, Bernasco
and Nieuwbeerta (2005) and Clare, Fernandez, and Morgan (2009) rightly
emphasized that such approaches do not consider the locations that offend-
ers do not target, and therefore, the distance to crime is treated as a depen-
dent variable rather than as an explanatory or independent one.
An alternative approach to analysis is the random utility model
(McFadden, 1974) or discrete choice approach. In this section, we discuss
the approach, starting with a few examples to illustrate the logic of the
method, and then we describe the statistical model applied. Regarding theo-
retical models of utility in criminology, rational choice theory (Cornish and
Clarke, 1986) explicitly considers offender decision-making processes at the
event level. Accordingly, when considering whether to offend, it is argued
that offenders engage in a rudimentary form of cost–benefit calculus, decid-
ing to offend when the benefits of such action are perceived to outweigh the
associated effort and risk (jointly, the associated costs). In terms of spatial
decision making, it has been suggested that this is a multistage process, with
offenders first selecting an area within which to offend and then selecting a
specific target (e.g., Bennet and Wright, 1984; Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta,
2005; Cornish and Clarke, 1986). In the case of area selection, individuals
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are assumed to choose the option from a set of alternatives that they per-
ceive will provide them with the greatest utility (the net outcome of their
cost–benefit calculus).
More detail will be provided in this article about the discrete choice ap-
proach, but this method can be used to model such decision making. In
particular, it can be used to consider simultaneously the characteristics of
the offenders, the origin from which their journey to crime is likely to have
started, the destination selected, and the set of alternative destinations that
could have been selected but that were not. To date, this approach has
been applied to offender target choice for residential burglary (Bernasco
and Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Clare, Fernandez, and Morgan, 2009) and street
robbery (Bernasco, 2009; Bernasco and Block, 2009; Bernasco, Block, and
Ruiter, 2012). In such studies, the distance between an offender’s home lo-
cation and the choice of target is treated as an independent variable and has
been found to be a good predictor of the areas in which he or she chooses to
offend. More interestingly, however, other variables, such as the presence
of schools (Bernasco and Block, 2009), also have been shown to influence
offender spatial decision making.
In addition to examining the influence of a particular variable on of-
fenders in general, in some studies, interaction terms are used to estimate
whether it is the case that some factors influence the target choices of one
group of offenders more than others. For example, Bernasco and Nieuw-
beerta (2005) and Clare, Fernandez, and Morgan (2009) found that the ef-
fect of distance is more pronounced for younger offenders than it is for
adults (those older than 18 years of age), although the results were only
statistically significant in the latter study.
According to rational choice theory, offender decision making will be
imperfect or bounded both as a consequence of offenders not having ac-
cess to complete information and as a result of observers of an offender’s
choices being unable to account fully for the utility calculation that the of-
fender performs. Nevertheless, according to this framework, the utility of
one choice is compared with the utility of others, and the one that offers the
best perceived utility to a particular offender is the one selected. Of course,
the information that is available to the observer is limited, and the informa-
tion available to the offender is assumed to be idiosyncratic and hence to
vary across offenders.
In terms of formal methods for modeling decision making of this kind,
the discrete choice approach is a class of model that concerns an individual’s
choice between a set of two or more discrete alternatives (for an overview,
see Train, 2003). To specify our model of discrete choice, we denote j as
a member of the set of alternatives from which chooser i selects a single
zone. In this case, the set of alternatives is given by the set of U.K. census
Lower Super Output Areas (LSOA) that partition Greater London (see the
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subsequent discussion). Supposing that offender i is to choose a member of
the set of alternatives in which to offend, we assume that he or she will
choose the alternative that maximizes their utility. In other words, if the
utility for offender i choosing zone j in which to offend is given by Uij, then
the offender will choose the zone k such that Uik > Uij for all j = k.
We model the utility of offender i choosing zone j as:
Ui j = Vi j + εi j (1)
whereVij is the utility gained by offender i choosing zone j that is associated
with some (systematic or) averaged set of preferences over the population,
and εij is the utility gained from unobserved personal preferences and the
idiosyncrasies of each rioter. For our model, we have:
Vi j =
M∑
m= 1
βmXmi j (2)
where M is the number of characteristics associated with the utility that
we are to explain, and it corresponds to the total number of independent
variables for which data are captured at the area level. In this formulation,
Xmij is the measured value of attribute m for offender i choosing to offend
in zone j, and βm is a coefficient associated with attribute m—estimated
from patterns in the data—in the evaluation of the utility of each available
choice. If attribute Xm is estimated to play little or no role in the observed
choices, then βm will approach zero.
Assuming that the error terms that account for the idiosyncrasies over
the population are independently and identically distributed according to
an extreme value type 1 distribution (Gumbel distribution), one can show
that (McFadden, 1974) the probability an offender chooses zone j is given
by:
P(Yi = j) = exp (Vi j )∑J
k=1 exp (Vik)
= exp (β1X1i j + β2X2i j + · · · + βMXMi j )∑J
k=1 exp (β1X1ik + β2X2ik + · · · + βMXMik)
(3)
where J is the number of zones available for the offender to choose be-
tween. This is the conditional logit model, and the βm may be estimated
using maximum likelihood estimation. The exp(βm) are partial coefficients
and are hence interpreted as the multiplicative effects of a one-unit increase
in a particular attribute of an area on the probability of chooser i select-
ing that area. Thus, if, for some variable m, exp(βm) equals 1, this means
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that there is no association between that variable and offender spatial deci-
sion making. Values above one suggest that the likelihood of an area being
chosen is positively associated with the variable considered. All models are
estimated using STATA 10 SE (StataCorp, College Station, TX).
DATA
In executing our research design, we are interested in offender decision
making at the area level, and our chosen unit of analysis is the U.K. census
LSOA. Data exist across the complete set of 4,765 LSOAs in the Greater
London area, and each LSOA typically consists of around 1,500 residents.
These areas are somewhat smaller than the units of analysis used in some
of the previous research using the discrete choice approach (e.g., Bernasco
and Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Clare, Fernandez, and Morgan, 2009) and indeed
are smaller than many previous empirical studies of rioting, which often
consider spatial distributions of rioting at a national level (Myers, 2000,
2010; Olzak and Shanahan, 1996; Spilerman, 1970, 1971, 1976). Distribu-
tions at finer scales of analysis have shown the complexities inherent in the
dynamics of riots and often can seem to raise more questions (e.g., Abudu
Stark et al., 1974; Bohstedt and Williams, 1988); however, this approach
enables us to test the consistency with which targets are chosen during riot-
ing. The advantage of smaller sized units of analysis in the discrete choice
approach is that the explanatory variables are more representative of the
population and characteristics of each area.1
As discussed, factors other than distance are likely to affect offender spa-
tial decision making, and hence, propinquity should be considered as just
one explanatory variable alongside others. In the sections that follow, we
describe each of the independent variables, identifying their provenance
and how they were manipulated, where appropriate. Before doing so, how-
ever, we discuss the dependent variable.
POLICE CRIME DATA
The police data consist of all offenses that were detected, and that were
identified as having been associated with the riots, by the Metropolitan po-
lice for the period August 6–11, 2011. All such offenses occurred within
1. One issue with using smaller areas is that failing to account for potential spillover
effects may lead to errors of inference. Spillover effects occur if an offender
chooses a location to offend based on the characteristics of nearby areas rather
than on the area itself. To address this issue, the models also were tested with spa-
tially lagged variables. The results were consistent with the model with no spatial
lag, and hence, the results were not included in this study.
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Figure 1. Histogram Showing the Age Distribution of
Offenders During the Riots
Greater London. Each record contained an identifier of the area within
which the offense took place, the area in which the offender was recorded
as living, the date and time at which the offense was estimated to have oc-
curred, and the age of the offender. No offender appears in the data more
than once. Figure 1 shows the age distribution of offenders. A large propor-
tion of the offenders is younger than 20 years of age; however, offenders
across the age spectrum are represented, creating the skewed distribution
observed—a distribution that is very similar to the typical age–crime curve
(e.g., Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 2008). Of the available data (N = 3,914),
2,299 records contained entries for both the residential and the offense lo-
cation. Only these data were used in the analysis, and table 2 details the
daily distribution of recorded riot events.
Table 3 details the types of offenses committed for the 2,299 records
used in the analysis. Most crimes were incidents of burglary or theft,
which supports the common view that looting was prevalent during the
riots, and therefore, it may have influenced the target choice of offend-
ers. Indeed, most crime types identified include those that would com-
monly be associated with rioting behavior (cf. Abudu Stark, 1974). Because
our primary interest lies in identifying the factors that most consistently
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Table 2. Number of Detections Analyzed by Day of Unrest
Date Number of Arrest Records Number of LSOAs Affected
August 6, 2011 54 20
August 7, 2011 232 42
August 8, 2011 1,477 247
August 9, 2011 446 162
August 10, 2011 90 55
Total 2,299 436
NOTE: The total number of LSOAs affected is the total number of LSOAs that experienced
rioting over the 5 days.
Table 3. Distribution of Different Crime Types Over the 5
Days of Rioting (N = 2,299)
Offense Type Percentage of Offenses
Burglary 59.1
Theft 11.4
Criminal damage 6.4
Violence against the person 4.5
Robbery 1.7
Other 16.8
influenced offender spatial decision making during the riots, we analyze all
the data.2
To implement the discrete choice model, it was necessary to calculate the
distance between the LSOA within which each offender was recorded as
living and the LSOA in which he or she committed the offense. To do this,
in line with previous research of this kind, we computed the Euclidean dis-
tance between the LSOA centroids for these origin and destination areas.
When an offender committed an offense within the LSOA within which he
or she resides, we computed the distance between the more precise loca-
tions at which he or she were recorded as living and the locations at which
he or she committed the offense. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these
journey-to-crime distances. Consistent with previous studies, and in line
with the expectations of CPT, we observe a clear pattern of distance decay.
Moreover, the scale and central tendency of the distribution of distances
traveled is very similar to that for other types of crime (see Rossmo, 2000).
2. In addition to analyzing all incidents together, we conducted analyses separately
for those arrests associated with crimes against property (burglary and criminal
damage) and for all other offenses. It was not possible to conduct separate analyses
for crimes against the person because of the low numbers of offenses involved. The
patterns of results (available upon request) were consistent with those reported in
the article and hence are discussed no further.
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Figure 2. Distance Decay Histogram Showing the Number of
Instances Where a Given Distance Was Traveled
Between the Residential Location of a Rioter and
the Location of the Offense Committed
Offenders are more likely to engage in civil unrest at locations that were
close to where they reside.
Figure 3 shows a map of Greater London and the LSOA geography. The
LSOAs within which offenses occurred on the first day of unrest (August 6)
are highlighted. Meanwhile, figure 4 shows the evolution of the spatial dis-
tribution of riot events in central London on the second, third, fourth, and
fifth days of unrest. A visual inspection of figure 4 suggests that the areas in
which rioting occurred varied somewhat from day to day.
CRIME PATTERN THEORY VARIABLES
The distance from the city center is calculated as the distance between
the centroid of each LSOA and the center of London (measured as a point
just south of Trafalgar Square: longitude –.1277, latitude 51.5073) in kilo-
meters. To determine whether an underground station is located within an
LSOA, we use location data of underground stations obtained from Open
Street Map (http://www.openstreetmap.org/). Operationalized as a binary
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Figure 3. Map of the LSOA Geography of Greater London
(Shaded Regions Indicate the Locations of
Recorded Offenses Associated with the Riots on
the First Day of Rioting)
indicator, values of 1 indicate that an LSOA contains a station and of 0 that
it does not. For retail floor space, we use the Valuation Office Agency floor
space data for the year 2004 (see http://www.planningstatistics.org.uk) to
calculate the total floor space of shops per 250 m2 within each LSOA. This
scaling is used merely to aid interpretation of the parameter estimates asso-
ciated with the variable, and it does not affect model estimation, the relative
importance of the variables, or their statistical significance. The number of
key stage 4 schools (roughly equivalent to secondary schools for those 11–16
years of age) in each LSOA is counted using data from the U.K. Depart-
ment of Education. Finally, each LSOA was coded as being located north
or south of the River Thames so that, for any LSOA pair, it was possible to
indicate whether the two areas were located on the same side of the river.
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Figure 4. Map of the LSOA Geography Showing the Major
Riot Locations in Central London (Shaded Regions
Indicate the Locations of Recorded Offenses
Associated with the Riots on Each Day of the
Disorder)
SOCIAL COHESION VARIABLES
The estimates of population churn rates and ethnic heterogeneity were
derived using data from the 2001 U.K. Census. We use the measure of pop-
ulation churn as outlined in Dennett and Stillwell (2008):
Ci =
(
Di + Oi + Wi
Pi
)
× 100 (4)
whereDi is the in-migration to area i,Oi is the out-migration from the area,
Wi is the total migrants that relocate from one residence to another while
remaining within the same area i, and Pi is the population of area i. To
aid interpretation, and for consistency with previous research of this kind
(e.g., Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005), these values are divided by ten so
that a one-unit increase in the independent variable represents a ten-unit
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change in the churn rate. Again, the data are scaled in this way merely to
aid interpretation of the parameter estimates.
To measure the ethnic heterogeneity of an area, we use the index of qual-
itative variation (see Agresti and Agresti, 1978; Wilcox, 1973), which is cal-
culated as follows:
Ej =
(
1 −
n∑
k=1
p2kj
)
× 100 (5)
where n is the total number of different ethnic groups and pkj is the propor-
tion of individuals belonging to ethnic group k that reside in zone j. Ej is,
therefore, the probability that two individuals selected at random from the
population of zone j will be of different ethnicities.3
To measure deprivation, we use the Index of Multiple Deprivation
(IMD) 2010 obtained from the U.K. Department for Communities and Lo-
cal Government (McLennan et al., 2011). As with the variable for the churn
rate (and for the same reasons), the estimates of ethnic diversity and the
IMD were divided by ten.
In addition to the variables discussed, a measure of population density is
included in the model. This measure is included to control for the potential
effects of this variable, but we do not test a substantive hypothesis regarding
the influence of population density in this article. The variable was opera-
tionalized using mid-2010 population estimates for LSOAs, obtained from
the U.K. Office for National Statistics.
COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR AND CONTAGION
Finally, to measure the effect that prior offenses at a location have on the
spatial decision making of a new potential rioter, for each event level deci-
sion, we count the number of detected offenses that were identified by the
police as having been associated with the riots that occurred at each LSOA
within the previous 24 hours of that decision. Thus, this variable is dynamic,
with the count of prior detected offenses for each LSOA potentially vary-
ing for every choice modeled. Table 4 summarizes the variables used in our
analysis that do not vary over time or by offender.
3. For this purpose, we use the categories for ethnicity as outlined in the 2001 U.K.
Census, which are as follows: White British, White Irish, other White, White
and Black Caribbean, White and Black African, other mixed, Indian, Pakistani,
Bangladeshi, other Asian, Caribbean, African, other Black, Chinese, and other
ethnic group.
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Table 4. Independent Variables Used to Characterize the
4,765 LSOA in Greater London
Standard
Variable Description Mean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum
School A count of the number
of key stage four
schools in the area
.153 .416 0 0 5
Underground
station
Binary indicator for
whether there is a
tube station in an
area
.051 .221 0 0 1
Retail floor space Measured in units of
(250 m2)
.035 .025 0 0 1.169
Distance to the
city center
Measured in km 12.454 5.777 .350 12.309 30.167
River Thames Binary indicator for
whether the LSOA is
north or south of the
river
.373 .484 0 0 1
Churn Churn rate, as given in
equation 4, divided
by 10
1.617 .655 1.704 2.381 6.621
Ethnic diversity Measure of ethnic
diversity, as given in
equation 5, divided
by 10
5.575 2.069 .692 6.072 8.735
Deprivation Index of multiple
deprivation divided
by 10
2.524 1.324 .170 2.381 6.621
RESULTS
As discussed, in this section, we examine what seems to have influenced
offender spatial decision making and whether and how this changed over
the course of the disorder. To do so, we analyze the observed patterns sep-
arately for each day of the riots. However, in the presentation of the re-
sults, we exclude the analyses for the first and last days of rioting because of
the small sample sizes involved (although the parameter estimates for these
days were consistent with those for the others). Figure 5 (see also Table
A.1) shows the parameter estimates for each of the 3 days of rioting exam-
ined, whereas table 5 shows the associated measures of goodness of fit for
each model.4
4. The results presented are robust to the inclusion of two other variables: a mea-
sure of police strength and a measure of police relations in the destination areas.
The parameter estimates for these variables are not included in this article as they
were measured at a level of geographic resolution that was much larger than the
LSOAs. The results also were found to be consistent when the standard errors
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Figure 5. Results for Each Variable of the Conditional Logit
Model, for Each Day of Unrest
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0 10.0
Odds Ratio
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IMD (10%)
Churn rate (10%)
Pop Density
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Thames
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Aug 8
Aug 9
Aug 7
Aug 8
Aug 9
Aug 7
Aug 8
Aug 9
Aug 7
Aug 8
Aug 9
Aug 7
Aug 8
Aug 9
95% Confidence intervals
Point estimates
Considering overall model fit, as is observed from table 5, the average
McFadden pseudo R-squared across all days of rioting is about .34.5 Pseudo
R-squared values tend to be much lower than the corresponding good-
ness of fit R-squared values for ordinary regression analysis, and McFadden
were clustered according to the location from which the offenders originated and
when the distances used were logged values.
5. Calculated as R2 = 1 − log(L(

θ ))
log(L(θ))
, where L(

θ) is the likelihood function that is cal-
culated using the best parameter estimates and L(θ) is the likelihood function
without any predictor variables and with intercepts only.
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Table 5. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Each Run of the
Model on Subsequent Days of Rioting
Statistic August 7 August 8 August 9
Pseudo R2 .36 .34 .31
Log likelihood –1,286.64 –8,213.27 –2,611.44
Likelihood ratio X2 1,424.10 8,624.95 2,331.52
N 232 1,477 446
(1979) stated that values between .2 and .4 represent an excellent fit to the
data. Thus, the model seems to explain the observed patterns across the 3
days tested rather well.
We now consider each variable in turn and determine whether the results
presented provide evidence in support of or against each of the hypotheses
specified. For coherence, the discussion of the results is organized according
to the theoretical perspectives identified in the introduction. Figure 5 also is
organized in this way; however, for aesthetic reasons, the variables are not
displayed in the precise order that they are now discussed.
The results suggest an unequivocal effect of propinquity (hypothesis 1)
on offender spatial decision making, with offenders (young or old) be-
ing more likely to target areas that were closer to their area of residence.
Roughly speaking, the odds of an offender selecting an area reduces by a
factor of around .6 for every kilometer an area is located from an offender’s
area of residence. These findings suggest that the rioting was fairly localized
and that in line with CPT, rioters were more likely to target areas that were
encompassed by their awareness spaces. This effect was more pronounced
for the juvenile offenders (hypothesis 2), a difference that reached statis-
tical significance for August 8 and 9 (all ps < .05) but not for August 7
(p > .19). We suggest that this finding—that the younger offenders tended
to travel shorter distances than their older counterparts—reflects the fact
that, as discussed in the Introduction, the former are likely to have more
limited geographical awareness spaces than the latter.
Considering potential (collective) routine activity nodes, all other things
being equal, the odds of an offender selecting an area increases by a factor
of between 1.29 and 2.09 for every additional school that is located within
it (hypothesis 3). Moreover, as expected, this was particularly the case for
juvenile offenders, at least for August 8 and 9 (all ps < .005), although for
August 7, the observed differences were nonsignificant (p > .65). Again,
the consistency of the findings provides support for CPT and suggests that,
as expected, the influence of particular types of routine activity nodes (such
as schools) influence the spatial decision making of different age groups of
offenders to differing degrees.
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Considering the accessibility of an area, or connectivity via the tube net-
work (hypothesis 4), all other things being equal, in line with CPT the pres-
ence of a tube station was a statistically significant predictor of whether an
area was selected for August 7 and 9. In fact, on those days, the odds of
an area being targeted by an offender more than doubled if it contained
a tube station. On August 8, the odds (of .92) of an area being targeted
were roughly the same despite whether it contained a tube station. This
may be explained by the fact that, on August 8, the rioting was so much
more widespread than on the other days that the ease of accessibility was
less of a concern on this particular day. Additionally, many tube stations
were actually closed on the evening of August 8, which would have limited
the influence of these nodes of activity on offender spatial decision making.
The effect of retail establishments (hypothesis 5) also was consistent, with
the odds of an area being targeted by an offender increasing by a factor of
around 1.28 for every additional 250 m2 of retail facilities located within it.
As for all coefficients, it is important to reiterate that this effect holds after
controlling for all other variables. For example, this can be interpreted as
suggesting that, given that two areas are located a similar distance from
the area within which an offender lives, an offender is more likely to riot
in an area that contains higher volumes of retail facilities than in one with
relatively lower volumes of retail facilities.
In terms of proximity to the city center (hypothesis 6), the patterns were
more ambiguous. On August 7, the odds ratio for this variable was statisti-
cally significant, but it was positive, suggesting that rioters were more likely
to offend farther away from the city center. On other days, the odds ratio
was clearly nonsignificant. One reason for the apparent absence of the in-
fluence of this variable might be that, for a city like London, the center may
be too crude to represent a routine activity node for all offenders. However,
there are no obvious alternatives to use as substitutes, so we do not pursue
this issue further. As to the presence of the Thames River (hypothesis 7),
the influence of this natural barrier seems to be consistent across all days,
with the odds of an offender selecting an area being up to five times higher
if that area is on the same side of the river as that within which he or she
lived. Again, this is entirely consistent with CPT.
Considering the variables associated with social disorganization, the odds
ratios were generally in line with expectation, but the results were mixed.
All other things being equal, areas with higher estimated levels of depri-
vation (hypothesis 10) were more likely to be selected on each day of
the riots. To be specific, the odds of an area being selected increases by
a factor of between 1.27 and 1.63 for every 10 unit increase in the in-
dex of deprivation. With respect to population churn (hypothesis 9), the
likelihood of an area being selected increased by a factor of around 1.20
for every 10 unit increase in the churn rate of that area. This effect was
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statistically significant on August 8 and 9 but not on August 7. Consider-
ing ethnic diversity (hypothesis 8), the odds ratio for this variable was only
statistically significant on 1 of the 3 days. In this case, on September 8, the
odds of an area being targeted by an offender increased by a factor of 1.19
for every 10 unit increase in ethnic heterogeneity within that area. Given
the inconsistency of these findings, we discuss them in a little more detail
subsequently.
The variable used to measure contagion (hypothesis 11)—indicating the
number of offenses in each area in the previous 24 hours—was significantly
associated with target choice during the London riots, as expected. Thus,
this suggests that, all other things being equal, offenders were more likely
to select an area if offenses had occurred in that area in the previous 24
hours. To illustrate, on September 7, the odds of an area being targeted
by an offender increased by a factor of 1.14 for every additional (detected)
incident that occurred in that area in the previous 24 hours. An interpreta-
tion of the raw odds ratios is slightly complicated in this case because the
scale of the independent variable varies from one day to the next. That is,
the mean number of incidents that occurred in the previous 24 hours in an
area would, in all likelihood, be higher on August 9 than on any other day.
Consequently, we would expect the odds ratio to be slightly smaller for this
day than for the others, which it is. In terms of the mechanism underlying
a process of social contagion, it is clear from the preceding discussion that
offenders tended to prefer locations that were close to their home locations
and, hence, that rather than attracting offenders from places far away, any
influence of social (or other) media most likely encouraged offenders to
engage in offending in their own neighborhoods or nearby.
One potential issue with this finding is that the variable used to esti-
mate the role of recent activity on offender spatial decision making may
instead have measured unobserved heterogeneity not otherwise captured
in the model. That is, it may have served to estimate the influence of time-
stable influences that vary spatially that were not explicitly represented by
any of the other independent variables. To test this hypothesis, we used an
alternative model specification. In this case, just three variables were used.
For each possible destination, these were the distance between that area
and the LSOA within which the offender lived, the number of offenders
who had rioted in that destination in the previous 24 hours, and the number
of offenders who had offended in that destination over the entire duration
of rioting (minus the number who had offended in it during the previous
24 hours). The third variable was intended to capture unobserved hetero-
geneity, and hence, in the event that the location of riots in one time period
did not affect those in the next, we would not expect our time-lagged vari-
able to explain any unique variance. The results (available upon request)
suggested that both variables were statistically significant, in the expected
direction. Thus, it would seem that rioters’ decisions of where to offend are
TARGET CHOICE DURING EXTREME EVENTS 275
not independent and that offenders are more likely to target an area if that
area was the location of riots in the previous 24 hours.
With respect to population density, it seems that, whereas the strength of
the effect decayed over the course of the 3 days, offenders tended to commit
offenses in those areas with lower population density. We do not speculate
on what this might indicate, but we note that the significant finding demon-
strates the value of including the variable in the model specification.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the current article was to advance understanding of the spatial
decision making of rioters and to consider the utility of different theoreti-
cal accounts. Models that examine the association between the frequency
of events in a set of areas and the characteristics of those areas may identify
features that seem to attract offenders, but such analyses usually take no
account of the abundance of offenders in or nearby them. This is problem-
atic insofar as an otherwise vulnerable area may be unlikely to be targeted
if it is isolated from the population of offenders. Similarly, areas that would
otherwise not be particularly vulnerable may be so if there is a high density
of offenders living near to them. Studies of the journey to crime suggest the
importance of this but consider only how far offenders typically travel to
offend and, hence, do not examine how the features of an area influence
offender decision making. In the current study, we use the discrete choice
approach, as it essentially allows us to exploit the benefits of the two ap-
proaches discussed while addressing their limitations.
In accordance with previous research on target selection during rioting,
across the 3 days of rioting considered, there is evidence to suggest that
offenders selectively choose targets. In addition, our results suggest that, on
the whole, those factors that are known to influence offender spatial deci-
sion making for everyday urban crime also explain target selection for those
engaged in riots. Considering the different theories examined, those factors
associated with crime pattern theory—namely, the distance an offender
travels between his or her residence and the offending location; whether
the Thames is to be crossed; and the presence of schools, retail centers, and
transport hubs—all seem to contribute to the spatial decision making of ri-
oters. The consistency of the findings, in terms of both their alignment with
the hypotheses articulated in the Introduction and the patterns observed
across the days for which data were analyzed, provide further support
for crime pattern theory as a model of offender spatial decision making.
Importantly, the current findings suggest the value of crime pattern theory
in explaining offender target selection in the extreme circumstances associ-
ated with riots, for which some scholars have previously argued that ratio-
nal decision making is abandoned (Le Bon, 1960), thereby suggesting the
generality of crime pattern theory as a model of offender decision making.
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The results also provide some support for theories of social disorganiza-
tion as influencing the spatial decision making of rioters. However, in this
case, the results were less clear. For instance, while offenders seemed to
have a preference for more deprived areas (all other things being equal) on
each day of the riots, areas in which residents were from a range of ethnic
backgrounds were not (as would be predicted by the theory) consistently
those in which incidents occurred. Of course, one issue with interpreting
these findings is that the indices used to estimate neighborhood levels of
ethnic diversity and rates of population churn were based on data from the
2001 U.K. Census. These data were used as they are the most recent that
are available, and in using them, we assume that the demographics (and
changes in them) of an area are relatively stable at least on the time scale
of a decade or so. However, the reader should take this into account. More-
over, in using such data, we follow the approach of Shaw andMcKay (1969)
and estimate levels of social disorganization indirectly. This approach is dif-
ferent than using survey samples to measure local social processes (e.g.,
Sampson and Groves, 1989; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997), and
the reader should take account of this too.
In terms of the mechanism through which social disorganization might
have a part to play, as discussed, cohesive neighborhoods might exert con-
trol over their residents to reduce the likelihood that they would engage
in the disorder. Alternatively, signs of social cohesion, or collective ac-
tion, might act as a barrier to deter rioters from targeting a neighborhood.
Such action was reported as helping to stop some of the rioting that took
place in the United States during the summer of 1967 (see Corman, 1967),
and while not systematic, anecdotal evidence from media coverage of the
London 2011 riots suggests that in some neighborhoods at least, residents
acted collectively to prevent rioters from targeting their neighborhoods.6 In
the current study, as our model specification concerns where rioters offend,
this type of mechanism is largely examined. Thus, future work might ex-
plore the alterative mechanism by considering the neighborhoods in which
offenders live, given where they offend.
Considering the temporal dynamics of riots, we tested whether recent ac-
tivity in an area positively influenced the likelihood that other rioters would
select that area to engage in disorder. All other things being equal, our re-
sults support this proposition. In the Introduction, we discussed two mecha-
nisms through which recent activity might influence the likelihood of rioters
6. Examples of media coverage that reported examples of collective action on
the part of residents can be found at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
uk/crime/vigilantes-join-16000-police-on-capitals-streets-2334910.html (accessed
November 28, 2012) and http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8691761/
London-riots-residents-fight-back.html# (accessed November 28, 2012).
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targeting a particular area. In the case of the first, the idea is that rioting pre-
cipitates further activity, encouraging those nearby to join in. In contrast,
according to the second, rioting may attract offenders from other areas, re-
gardless of how far apart they are. Such a process would be expected to
operate if the riots were to some extent coordinated, using social media or
other means. However, the same dynamics might be observed if the rioters
were responding to other information about the locations of riots such as
traditional media reports in newspapers, radio, and television. Although we
cannot rule out the latter explanation, and recognizing that both processes
may have a part to play, the finding that most rioting occurred near to where
offenders reside seems to provide more support for the first explanation.
As discussed in the Introduction, this type of effect has been described
by some as a contagion-like process, but we are a little cautious of overus-
ing that term because of the connotations associated with it. Nevertheless,
we suggest that further investigation into such processes during civil disor-
der would provide fruitful results. For instance, using a smaller temporal
lag than the 24-hour period used in the current study might enhance un-
derstanding of the duration over which rioters’ spatial decision making is
affected by recent events and, hence, inform the deployment of police re-
sources. Further work also might explore the extent to which offenders or
groups of them return to the same or nearby areas on consecutive days, or
whether those involved vary from one day to the next (for a discussion of
such processes, see Johnson, 2008).
Another likely influence on offender spatial decision making that was not
included in our analysis was the spatial allocation of police resources. The
presence of police officers in an area may have influenced the rioters in sev-
eral ways. For example, they may have physically prevented rioters from
entering areas or engaging in the disorder, or they may have deterred them
from targeting a location by shaping their perceptions of the risk of arrest
in that area (see Davies et al., 2013). Unfortunately, data regarding police
activity were unavailable for analysis, and so we could not estimate the ef-
fect of police officer presence, or the number of arrests made in an area
during the riots, on offender spatial decision making. In terms of the actual
arrests made, however, it is worth noting that the majority took place after
the riots, with most resulting from the analysis of CCTV footage (Laville,
2011) rather than from on-the-spot arrests.7 Moreover, although it would
7. As of Tuesday, August 9, 2011, 525 people had been arrested in London (Laville,
2011). This number rose to more than 1,000 by August 12—after the
conclusion of the riots (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-14501926)
—and rocketed to almost 3,000 by early October 2011 (http://www.standard.
co.uk/news/three-thousand-arrests-made-over-london-riots-offences-
6451169.html).
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be advantageous to include such data, it is important to remember that the
models reported here explained a large amount of the variance in offender
spatial decision making despite such data not being available for analysis.
In summary, using a discrete choice approach, the current study provides
further support to suggest that the choices made by rioters are not irra-
tional. Using data concerned with the victims of offenses (e.g., Berk and
Aldrich, 1972), previous studies have suggested this to be the case for the
types of buildings targeted by looters. The contribution made by this ar-
ticle is to extend this line of enquiry by using data for the offenders in-
volved and by examining the characteristics of the areas within which they
offend and those in which they do not. Our findings provide support for the
idea that theories developed to explain everyday urban crimes, particularly
crime pattern theory, have a role to play in explaining offender decision
making, even when law and order is under threat.
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APPENDIX
Table A.1. Odds Ratios (eβ) for the Conditional Logit Model, as Plotted in
Figure 5
August 7 August 8 August 9
Variable Lower Mean Upper Lower Mean Upper Lower Mean Upper
School adult 1.53 1.89∗ 2.33 1.14 1.29∗ 1.46 1.12 1.37∗ 1.67
School minor 1.55 2.09∗ 2.82 1.49 1.73∗ 2.01 1.49 1.98∗ 2.62
Tube 1.45 2.35∗ 3.79 .70 .92 1.21 2.04 2.80∗ 3.87
Thames 1.13 3.01∗ 8.42 3.76 5.13∗ 7.01 2.40 4.41∗ 8.11
Retail 250 m2 1.24 1.31∗ 1.38 1.26 1.28∗ 1.32 1.19 1.24∗ 1.29
Previous 24 hours 1.12 1.14∗ 1.16 1.06 1.07∗ 1.07 1.03 1.04∗ 1.05
Dist CTR 1.05 1.11∗ 1.17 .97 .99 1.01 .97 1.01 1.05
O-D dist adult .61 .65∗ .69 .63 .64∗ .66 .60 .63∗ .66
O-D dist juvenile .55 .61∗ .67 .56 .58∗ .60 .44 .49∗ .54
Population density .86 .89∗ .92 .93 .94∗ .96 .96 .99 1.01
Churn rate .90 1.13 1.44 1.11 1.20∗ 1.31 1.15 1.33∗ 1.53
IMD 1.37 1.57∗ 1.80 1.55 1.63∗ 1.72 1.16 1.27∗ 1.40
Ethnic diversity .98 1.10 1.26 1.14 1.19∗ 1.25 .93 1.01 1.10
N 232 1,477 446
∗Statistically significant odds ratio (p < .05).
